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LOUIS P. CAIN & BROOKS A. KAISER*

Public Goods Provision: Lessons from
the Tellico Dam Controversy
ABSTRACT
Although absent from the initial Endangered Species Act (ESA)
of 1973, evidence of economic considerationsfirst appeared in the
1978 amendments. The only controversial vote concerning the
ESA was the one to exempt the Tellico Dam (1978). Although the
dam was a local project with little expected net benefit, this article
argues that broader economic considerations mattered. Working
from public choice models for congressional voting decisions, a
limited dependent variable regression analysis indicates the
economic variables with the most explanatory power for this
environmental decision are college education, poverty, the
designation of critical habitat within a district, the number of
endangered species in the state, dollars the state received due to
earlier ESA funding, and the percentage of the district that is
federal land. Comparisons with aggregated environmental votes
in the same year highlight the intensity of economic
considerations in the Tellico case. Our results imply that the
ESA's prohibitions have worked successfully to give weight to
nonquantiflable and dispersed benefits in the face of concentrated
and visible costs.
INTRODUCTION
The man said that these prodigious animals had heard
about the ark and were coming. Coming to get saved from
the flood. And not coming in pairs, they were ALL coming:
they didn't know the passengers were restricted to pairs
... and wouldn't care a nap for the regulations, anywayLouis P. Cain is Professor of Economics at Loyola University of Chicago and
Adjunct Professor of Economics at Northwestern University. Brooks A. Kaiser is an
Assistant Professor at Gettysburg College. We gratefully acknowledge the helpful
comments of Lee Alston, Dan Barbezat, Ann Fender, Joe Ferrie, Price Fishback, Avner
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Mokyr, Rob Porter, and the participants at presentations at Northwestern University,
University of Illinois-Chicago, Conference on Quantitative Methods in Canadian Economic
History, University of Illinois-Urbana-Champaign, DePaul University, Northern Illinois
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they would sail in that Ark or know the reason why. The
man said the Ark would not hold half of them; and
moreover they were coming hungry, and would eat up
everything there was, including the menagerie and the
family .... Those powerful animals would be of inestimable
value to man now, when transportation is so hard pressed
and expensive, but they are all lost to him.'
In the early 1960s, new ideas about the quality of life emerged,
including new concerns about human beings and their physical environment. The concept of species preservation ultimately became the
Endangered Species Act (ESA) of 1973.2 Congress passed legislation to
address a narrowly defined, purely biological issue. By defining the issue
so narrowly, Congress ignored economic considerations. Yet, the
economic costs of this act and subsequent amendments (plus two
predecessors and several related statutes) 3 have been extraordinary,
while the benefits have eluded quantification. Listing a single species can
result in thousands of jobs lost and millions of acres restricted from its
most remunerative use.4 Renewal of the act has been stalled for several
years because of these economic considerations. When did the pendulum
shift?
The ESA and two earlier acts passed both houses of Congress
with overwhelming majorities, usually by voice votes.' There was one
exception to this consensus behavior, the 1978 vote to exempt the Tellico
Dam from the ESA. This vote highlights the public goods problem
endemic to species preservation: the costs are localized, visible, and
concentrated, while the benefits are uncertain and widely distributed.
This vote is one of few places in wildlife law where the opportunity
exists to examine the tradeoff between biodiversity and economic costs.
1.
MARK TWAIN (SAMUEL LANGHORNE CLEMENS), LETTERS FROM THE EARTH, Letter V
(HarperPerennial, Bernard DeVoto ed., 1991) (1909).
2. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1540 (1973).
3. Endangered Species Preservation Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-669, 80 Stat. 926
(repealed 1973); Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-135, 83 Stat.
275 (repealed 1973); Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407.
4. The political economy of the listing process is discussed in Amy Whritenour Ando,
Waiting to Be Protected under the Endangered Species Act: The Political Economy of Regulatory
Delay, 42 J.L. & ECON. 29 (1999). The incentive of landowners to preemptively destroy
habitat is discussed in Dean Lueck & Jeffrey A. Michael, Preemptive Habitat Destruction
under the Endangered Species Act, 46 J.L. & ECON. 27 (2003).
5. All voting in Congress is a matter of public record. "However, not all floor votes
are roll call votes. There are voice votes ('aye' or 'no') and division or standing votes
(where the presiding officer counts Members), and these types of votes do not indicate by
name how a Member voted." U.S. Senate, How to... find out about congressional voting,
available at http://www.senate.gov/reference/common/faq/how-to-votes.htm
(last
visited Nov. 17, 2003).
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This article explores the question of whether economic concerns
mattered in the congressional vote to exempt the Tellico Dam.
Experts, particularly Mehmood and Zhang,6 have investigated
this vote within the context of public choice. This article improves upon
previous analyses in three ways. First, the data analyzed are at the
congressional district level for most variables, including species and
habitat, which allows closer scrutiny of district choices. Second, the
multi-dimensional role of the presence of endangered species in a district
is separated into four effects: listed species were in a district; critical
habitat had been designated early, signifying serious threats, high
benefits, and/or low costs of compliance; states could receive federal
funds made available for compliance with the ESA; and disputes over
endangered species often disguised disputes over land use, particularly
federal lands utilized by multiple and potentially conflicting constituents. Third, this article places the Tellico vote in the context of other
environmental legislation of the same year. This permits a consideration
of the extent to which a representative's support for the act is based on a
strict analysis of the true costs and benefits to the district of this
particular enactment rather than simply demonstrating support as a
generalized environmental concern. This is of particular interest because
it addresses the overwhelming support for endangered species
legislation within the context of imperfect information about the
consequences of a prohibitive act versus a simple warm-glow argument
for environmental causes.
Potential economic impacts were not discussed during the
House hearings on the ESA and received little notice in the Senate
hearings. The questions surrounding endangered species were perceived
as strictly scientific, ones that could be answered by experts without
regard to economic impact. This reason is the one customarily given for7
Congress's passage of the ESA with such an overwhelming majority.
Congress therefore addressed the problem of endangered species with a
prohibitive policy that lessened the likelihood that competing interests
could be balanced. 8
One of the competing interests is the economic interest of those
whose resources (especially land and water) are affected by the ESA. The
act's prohibitions "take" from the owner the right to use the land in
6.

Sayeed R. Mehmood & Daowei Zhang, A Roll Call Analysis of the Endangered Species

Act Amendments, 83 AMER. J.AGRIc. ECON. 501-12 (2001).
7. Jon A. Souder, Chasing Armadillos Down Yellow Lines: Economics in the Endangered
Species Act, 33 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1095 (1993) (arguing that Congress believed such species
were what came to be called "charismatic megafauna" rather than "uncharismatic microfauna").
8. See generally STEVEN LEWIS YAFFEE, PROHIBITIVE POLICY: IMPLEMENTING THE
FEDERAL ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT (1982).
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particular ways, potentially the ways in which the market valued its
marginal revenue product prior to the ESA's inception. Nevertheless, it
is widely believed that the benefits of prohibition far outweigh the costs,
regardless of their size. Many critics have noted that no allowance for
compensation exists.9
The benefits of species preservation are viewed as long-run and
diffused over many future generations, while those of alternative uses
(e.g., food production for the poor) are short-run and far easier to
quantify. One benefit of preservation is ecological; the survival of the
human species depends on the survival of other species. To use the
conventional metaphor, there is a common fabric of life, and the loss of
even a few threads could lead to a rapid unraveling, a mass extinction.
While there are estimates of the value of one human life, how does one
put a value on the disappearance of a species? 10
The other benefit is economic-the potentially valuable, as-yetunknown information otherwise irretrievably lost as a result of extinction." To quote Edward Wilson,
The surviving biosphere remains the great unknown of
Earth in many respects. On the practical side, it is hard
even to imagine what other species have to offer in the way
of new pharmaceuticals, crops, fibers, petroleum substitutes and other products. We have only a poor grasp of the
ecosystem services by which other organisms cleanse the

9. See Richard L. Stroup, The Economics of Compensating Property Owners, 15 CONTEMP.
ECON. POL'Y 55 (1997).
10. See W. Kip Viscusi, The Value of Risks to Life and Health, 31 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1912
(1993); Robert Costanza et al., The Value of the World's Ecosystem Services and Natural Capital,
387 NATURE 253 (1997) (arguing that ecosystem services are valued at levels several times
greater than world GDP); John Loomis & Douglas S. White, Economic Benefits of Rare and
Endangered Species: Summary and Meta Analysis, 18 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 197-206 (1996)
(providing an overview of value estimates of endangered species); Daniel A. Hagen et al.,
Benefits of Preserving Old-Growth Forests and the Spotted Owl, 10 CONTEMP. POL'Y ISSUES 13
(1992) (providing a prototypical contingent valuation study of willingness to pay to
preserve old-growth forests and the spotted owl); Martin L. Weitzman, The Noah's Ark
Problem, 66 ECONOMETRICA 1279 (1998); Andrew Metrick & Martin L. Weitzman, Conflicts
and Choices in Biodiversity Preservation, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 21 (1998) (addressing theoretical
concerns in valuation of biodiversity).
11. R. David Simpson et al., Valuing Biodiversityfor Use in PharmaceuticalResearch, 104J.
POL. EcON. 163 (1996). See also Gordon C. Rausser & Arthur A. Small, Valuing Research
Leads: Bioprospecting and the Conservation of Genetic Resources, 108 J. POL. ECON. 173, 173-206
(2000) (discussing the potential for pharmaceutical or scientific research gain from
biodiversity, which may be quite low). There is also an aesthetic benefit. See generally E.O.
WILSON, BIOPHILIA (1984) (arguing that the sensory and intellectual stimulation we derive
from other life forms is a basic human need).
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water, turn soil into a fertile living cover and manufacture
the very air we breathe. 2
Each organism contains a genetically coded blueprint that permits
scientists to produce those pharmaceuticals, crops, and the like. The only
way we can retain the information from, say, a seemingly insignificant
fish is to protect it, to preserve it, and to prohibit alternatives that
threaten it.
By 1978, there was considerable concern expressed about the
act's economic impact, and the Tellico case was the "lightning rod that
attracted attention to the uncompromising nature of the Act's requirements.", 3 Economic interests were reflected in the 1978 amendments to
the ESA, which were passed by voice vote. Were they also apparent in
the October 1978 vote to exempt the Tellico Dam? The idea that Congress
would initiate a prohibitive policy concerned with maximizing distant
and uncertain benefits is surprising given that one expects utilitymaximizing politicians to be myopic. Can the overwhelmingly favorable
vote on the ESA be attributed to a lack of understanding of the act's
potential economic ramifications?
The first section of this article discusses the background of the
lack of economic considerations in the ESA. The second section discusses
the events surrounding the battle between the Snail darter and the
Tellico Dam. When the economic impact of ESA's prohibitions created a
real problem and experts could not find an answer that balanced
competing interests, they turned to Congress. The third section presents
some conceptual issues, while the hypothesis that economics played a
measurable and significant role in the exemption vote is analyzed in the
fourth section. We conclude that economic interests were represented in
the vote. The final section discusses the immediate aftermath of this
episode, where votes on extending the ESA have been overwhelming
majorities in favor of protection and prohibition. In the last decade or so,
economic considerations (e.g., the presence of a "Tellico-like" situation in
one's own district) have stalled votes on extensions.
I. THE LEGAL UNDERPINNINGS
Following the American Revolution, the legal doctrine of state
ownership of wildlife emerged. 4 By the end of the century, however, the
12.
13.
14.

E.O. Wilson, Is Humanity Suicidal?,N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 30,1993, at 29.
Souder, supra note 7, at 1102.
The powers held by the English crown and Parliament devolved to the states.
Excellent overviews can be found in MICHAEL J. BEAN, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL
WILDLIFE LAW (1983); Dean Lueck, The Law and Politics of Federal Wildlife Preservation, in
POLITICAL ENVIRONMENTALISM (Terry L. Anderson ed., 1999); Dean Lueck, Ownership and
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federal government began to assert itself. Dean Lueck has argued that
the geographical jurisdiction of the party controlling wildlife stocks is a
function of the stock's territory. Hence, the federal government became
involved with migratory species whose territorial requirements crossed
state lines. The drafting of the Lacey Act, 5 the Migratory Bird Act, 16 and
other early federal statutes was motivated, at least in part, by what was
perceived as an accelerating rate of species extinction. Both the extent of
wildlife protected and the nature of the protection were narrowly
defined in these laws.
Act 17
The motivation for the Endangered Species Preservation
was the "broadening knowledge about endangered species, growing
public concern for protecting non-game animals, pressure from
administrative experts, and congressional awareness of a symbolic issue
that 'no one was against...."" 8 In August 1964, the Interior Department
published a "preliminary copy" of the "Redbook," the first official
federal list of endangered species. 19 The 62 vertebrate species were
selected solely on the basis of biological data and informal expert
opinion.' The act authorized the Secretary of the Interior to use the land
acquisition authority of existing laws to meet the act's goals; none of this
was viewed as incurring any real costs.2 ' The Endangered Species
Conservation Act2 extended this approach internationally. 2
the Regulation of Wildlife, 29 ECON. INQUIRY 249 (1991); Dean Lueck, The Economic Nature of
Wildlife Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 291 (1989); YAFFEE, supra note 8.
15. Lacey Act, ch. 533 § 1, 31 Stat. 187 (1900).
16. Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. § 703-712 (1918).
17. Endangered Species Preservation Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-669, 80 Stat. 926,
repealedby Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1982).
18. YAFFEE, supra note 8, at 39. Responsibility for administering federal law currently
resides in the Fish and Wildlife Service of the Interior Department and the National Marine
Fisheries Service of the Commerce Department. Id.
19. The list is contained in Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, 50 CFR §§
17.11-17.12 (2003).
20. The book was the work of the Committee on Rare and Endangered Wildlife
Species, a group of nine biologists appointed by the Bureau of Sports Fisheries and
Wildlife, U.S. Dep't of the Interior. The copy was "preliminary" because, as the committee
explicitly admitted, the criteria for listing were not clearly defined. Since the Redbook
listing did not signify formal federal protection, there could be no harm. The first official
list in 1968 included 142 species.
21. Especially since the U.S. Department of the Interior testified that only 78 species
were involved, an increase of 16 in the years since the publication of the "preliminary"
copy of the Redbook.
22. Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-135, 83 Stat. 275
(repealed in 1973).
23. The legislation directed the government to encourage other countries to join the
effort to conserve wildlife. In particular, the government was to convene an "international
ministerial meeting" that would lead to "a binding international convention on the
conservation of endangered species." Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087. As the title suggests,
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President Richard Nixon, in his Environmental Message of
February 1972, noted that this body of law "simply does not provide the
kind of management tool needed to act early enough to save a vanishing
species." Nixon proposed legislation that "would make the taking of
endangered species a federal offense, and would permit protection
measures to be undertaken before a species is so depleted that
restoration is impossible."24 The result was the Endangered Species Act.
The act categorized species as either "endangered" or "threatened. "5 The
threatened category was designed to protect species before they became
endangered and to continue to protect them once they were removed
from the endangered list. The act made the taking of an endangered
species anywhere within the United States a federal offense.
Mann and Plummer argue that the key difference between the
ESA and the earlier acts was the elimination of the word "practicable."26
Earlier legislation encouraged other federal agencies to safeguard
biodiversity "where practicable," a phrase that allowed for balancing. In
practice, other agencies rarely found such action practicable. By
eliminating the word, a failure to balance was replaced with wording
that eliminated balancing altogether, which created a prohibitive policy.
Congress evidently did not appreciate the significance of this subtle
change. While the authors of the ESA did, they did not anticipate its
economic implications.
Yaffee argues that the act embraced a "prohibitive policy" for
three reasons. First, the issue was symbolic; no one seemed to notice that
Congress essentially banned a natural process-extinction. The hearings
in the House and Senate focused on such issues as states' rights, the
listing process, and the rights of individuals, particularly Alaskan
natives, to take a member of an endangered species.27 Second, the
endangered species problem was defined as a technical one by scientific
experts rather than as one involving a tradeoff between conflicting social
goals. The Act made it clear that economic considerations could not be
used when listing a species nor when designating proposed "critical
habitat," a concept that was not defined in the ESA but came to mean

CITES is limited to trade; it does not provide a comprehensive blueprint for species
preservation.
24. Quoted in BEAN, supra note 14, at 329; YAFFEE, supra note 8, at 49.
25. In the Marine Mammal Protection Act (16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1972)), special
protection was available once a species was considered "depleted," but not yet
"endangered." This division was limited to animals in 1973; it was extended to plants in the
1978 amendments. The compromise with the fur industry requiring that species be
"threatened with worldwide extinction" was dropped.
26. CHARLES C. MANN & MARK L. PLUMMER,
ENDANGERED SPECIES 158-60 (1995).

27.

Souder, supra note 7, at 1101.

NOAH'S CHOICE: THE FUTURE OF
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"essential for preservation."2' There was no attempt to make even a
rudimentary cost-benefit calculation, although the possible effects on
future economic development were mentioned during Senate hearings.
Finally, it was not clear whose interest would be harmed before the fact
as "Congress defined the law prohibitively because no one told them not
to."' The bill passed the Senate 92 to 0 on July 24 and the House 390 to
12 on September 18. Shortly after the Act was passed, concerns arose and
Congress began to consider the cost of species preservation. One set of
concerns was economic. Amendments passed in 1978 inserted economic
considerations in two places to provide balance. One place was during
the phase when critical habitat was determined. The other was the
creation of the Endangered Species Committee (also known as "the God
Committee") in which a super-majority could exempt a project from the
prohibitions of the ESA.30
Interest group "watchdogs" were expected to complain when
they perceived that "a critical habitat" was endangered, which is exactly
what they did in Tennessee. As Yaffee has documented persuasively,
"There is in fact enormous amounts of uncertainty and latitude involved
in these seemingly technical decisions. Choice and judgment are pervasive.""
II. THE TELLICO DAM CONTROVERSY
The ESA held species preservation to be an important American
"value," one that had a monetary value of infinity. The law was
specific-any and all actions that brought harm to a threatened or
endangered species (broadly defined to include habitat) were prohibited.
Any action, no matter how profitable to an individual, a firm, or even
society, could be stopped. Or could it?

28. In practice, this could include all or just a portion of the existing habitat.
29. YAFFEE, supra note 8, at 47. Congressional hearings revealed little opposition. In
fact, there was no testimony from anyone who could be considered as having a direct
economic interest.
30. Another concern reflected the broad interpretation given to the word "species."
Until the 1960s, scientists estimated the total number of species at approximately 3 million.
Advances in both taxonomy and statistics over the next two decades caused that estimate
to be raised to 10 million. This explosion suggests the possibility that many more species,
especially "minor" ones, were endangered than originally believed. The explosion forced
the staff of the Fish and Wildlife Service's Office of Endangered Species to establish some
priorities in selecting species for review. YAFFEE, supra note 8, at 18.
31. Id. at ix. See also Ando, supranote 4.
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The Tellico Dam project provided an almost immediate test of
the ESA and its prohibitive policy? 2 The dam was conceived in the late
1930s, but the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) did not fund it until
1967. 3' The project was controversial from the outset. It would create a
16,000-acre reservoir over part of the Little Tennessee River, but no new
energy capacity would be developed. The project's goal seemed to be to
create higher residential land values and recreational opportunities,
including a new community of 50,000. In the process, it would eliminate
Tanasi, capitol of the Cherokee nation, other cultural sites, and about 600
family farms on prime agricultural land. It would also change the
ecology of a wild river with superb trout fishing to that of a regulated
reservoir.
In 1969, Congress passed the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) " mandating that an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) must
be filed when a proposed action would likely affect the environment.
The TVA tried to avoid filing an EIS and was sued successfully in 1971 as
a result. Cherokee leaders, who originally opposed the dam, agreed to
the resumption of construction when the EIS included promises of
archeological surveillance and a Cherokee cultural center. These
negotiations delayed the resumption of construction until 1973.
This delay proved just long enough for the dam to face another
legal innovation-the ESA. In accordance with the 1960s acts, surveys of
the area's endangered species were underway, but the provision for the
preservation of critical habitat in the 1973 act presented a new problem.
In 1973, a biologist opposed to the dam found a previously unknown
(and therefore rare) fish, the Snail darter, a member of the perch family,
while snorkeling in the Little Tennessee River below the dam. Over the
next two years scientists determined that the Snail darter had distinct
biological differences from other species. Consequently, it was listed as
an endangered species whose critical habitat was limited to the Little
Tennessee River, a habitat that would be drastically changed by
impoundment.35 So, although the dam was nearly complete, a court
order halted the project.

32. See generally TVA: FIFTY YEARS OF GRAss-RooTs BUREAUCRACY (Paul K. Conkin &
Erwin C. Hargrove eds., 1983); WILLIAM BRUCE WHEELER, TVA AND THE TELLICO DAM, 19361979 (1986).
33. Congress authorized funds in 1942, but the War Production Board took them
within four months. The dam was reauthorized in 1966. MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 26,
at 164.
34. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 USC §§ 4321-4370f.
35. In an attempt to comply with the ESA and complete the dam, specimens were
successfully transplanted from the Little Tennessee River to form a new population in a
nearby river. After the fact, the Snail darter was found living in several other locations.
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The TVA argued that the project should be exempt from the 1973
requirements because it had begun construction before Congress passed
the law. The courts, by denying the TVA the right to complete the dam,
essentially chose to leave this decision to Congress. In early 1978, at the
urging of Senate minority leader Howard Baker of Tennessee, Congress
created the "God Committee" in response to the Tellico situation.3 After
reviewing the facts, this committee unanimously rejected the TVA's
3
request for an exemption in January 1979. ' The TVA's only remaining
recourse was Congress.
Tennessee Congressman Duncan, with the assistance of Senator
Baker, had submitted an amendment exempting the Tellico Dam. The
House of Representatives, with Republicans voting largely as a block,
passed HR 14104 exempting the dam from the Act (231 to 57: R 99 to 30,
D 132 to 127)38 in October of 1978. The Senate waited on the decision of
the God Committee, then rejected the amendment (43 to 52: R 23 to 17, D
20 to 35)39 the following June. The next day, the congressman from the
Tellico district added the exemption to a Public Works Appropriation
bill that immediately passed the House. The Senate initially passed only
the appropriation bill, but the conference bill including the exemption
amendment passed in November 1979. President Carter, who opposed
the Tellico Project, did not have the political will to veto the entire
appropriation bill. Thus, the dam was completed and the reservoir filled.
Beneath the political machinations, there was a clear reality-the
"devastatingly absolute" strictness of the ESA had been, and could be,
circumvented for economic reasons. When the issues were broad and
nonspecific, congressional votes for the protection of species were
overwhelmingly in favor of protection. When the issue became specific,
when a small fish with little market or recreational value stopped a
federal project involving many millions of dollars, congressmen became
much more sensitive to economic concerns. Who was to say that a Snail
darter would not turn up in one's own district?
III. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Before addressing whether economic concerns impacted the vote
to exempt the Tellico Dam, the question of how representatives vote
must be addressed in order to determine if some aspects of the Tellico
vote can be explained by political machinations.

36.
37.
38.
39.

Souder, supra note 7, at 1104.
MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 26, at 171.
Vote 813,34 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 230-H (1978).
S1143, Endangered Species Act, Vote 128, 35 CONG.

Q. ALMANAC

23-S (1979).
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A. The Tellico Vote and Some Political Considerations
The Tellico Dam project has the qualities of a typical public
works project; the direct benefits accrue to a limited, localized minority
while the costs are dispersed. One expects log-rolling, or vote trading, in
such a situation. 40 Further, there is an ideological dimension to this vote
that involves voters' attitudes toward the tradeoff between economic
growth and endangered species and their attitudes toward the TVA (or
public works projects in general). With Senator Baker as Senate minority
leader, Republican votes were going to be affected by his position.
1. Log-rolling
Although log-rolling is often present in a public works bill for
water projects, the likelihood of its presence in the vote on this
amendment was small because the beneficiaries of the dam were a few
Tennesseans. While Tennessee's congressmen might have been more
than willing to trade votes, there is no evidence of log-rolling in the
Congressional Record or elsewhere in the literature.41 If vote trading had
been used to attain this majority, many unnecessary trades would have
occurred as the measure passed by a substantial majority in the House
and failed in the Senate. Consequently, while it might have occurred,
42
log-rolling was not considered a significant factor in the House vote.
2. Ideology
In many ways, the Tellico Dam vote was a test of the increasing
powers granted to wildlife protection over the century as each of the acts
mentioned in the first section passed with substantial majorities. Few
congressmen wanted to go on record saying they were against actions
that might prevent the extinction of an endangered species. The Tellico
vote was the first congressional test of the adopted prohibitive policy
and the ESA was altered by it. The insistence that economic criteria be set
aside in determining the future of an endangered species (and its habitat)
failed to accommodate the case of a relatively obscure species directly in
40. Thomas Stratmann, The Effects of Logrolling on Congressional Voting, 82 AM. ECON.
REV. 1162 n.5 (1992).
41. See generally DOUGLAS A. IRWIN & RANDALL S. KROSZNER, Log-Rolling and Economic
Interests in the Passage of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff 45 CARNEGIE-ROCHESTER CONF. SERIES ON
PUB. POL'Y 173-200 (1996) for a statistical documentation of log-rolling by comparing Senate
voting patterns as a means to predict voting on related amendments, using controversial 1930
legislation as an example and discussing contemporary studies related statistically. There is no
mention of vote trading anywhere in the literature and no obvious alternative vote to use to test for
the presence of trading.
42. It is possible that votes were traded in the Senate vote that finally passed the
exemption in July 1979.
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conflict with an expensive federal project. While the ESA required that
any decision regarding the listing of species and their critical habitat
ignore economic concerns and focus exclusively on the best scientific
evidence available, Congress faced no such constraint in this vote.
Thus, a second layer of ideological thinking emerges that weighs
the act's uncertain benefits and costs against those of the dam. Levitt,
who studied Senate votes, suggests that a Senator's own ideology is the
primary determinant of roll-call voting patterns and voter preferences
play a less significant role.43 One of the assumptions of Levitt's work,
however, is that "state voter preferences are assumed to be reasonably
proxied by the roll-call voting patterns of a state's House delegation."
Members of the House might be more likely to vote in a manner
reflecting the preferences of voters in their district because they
represent smaller, potentially less diverse constituencies. Their ideology
has been shaped by the same influences as the voters in their district.
Since the ideological question of the role of the government in
preserving endangered species had been answered several times before
the Tellico Dam controversy, with virtually every voter choosing
preservation, the vote on this exemption should represent the weighing
of the costs of federal preservation versus its benefits.
3. Partypolitics
Senator Baker issued a directive that Republicans should vote in
favor of the exemption, and most did. The Republican vote in the House
was 99 to 30 in favor. Democrats, however, were split almost down the
middle, with a vote of 132 to 127 in favor. 4 Political affiliation was
clearly a more important aspect of the vote for Republican congressmen.
Research on general political trends of party and ideology toward
environmental issues support the hypothesis that liberals are more
concerned about environmental quality than conservatives. While both
weigh heavily, this ideological split appears stronger than the
corresponding party split.4 Hence, we began to analyze the Tellico vote
by controlling for ideology.
Poole and Rosenthal explain the underlying patterns in congressional roll-call votes with two D-NOMINATE dimensions. 6 They assign
43. Voter preferences accounted for only one-fourth of the weight in Senators' utility
functions.
44. See Vote 813, supra note 38.
45. Kent D. van Liere & Riley E. Dunlap, The Social Bases of Environmental Concern: A
Review of Hypotheses, Explanations, and Empirical Evidence, 44 PUB. OPINION Q. 181, 187
(1980).
46. See Keith T. Poole & Howard Rosenthal, Congress and Railroad Regulation: 1874 to
1887, in THE REGULATED ECONOMY: A HISTORICAL APPROACH TO POLITICAL ECONOMY 81-
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"a coordinate pair representing the legislator's position in a twodimensional Euclidean space" to each legislator who ever served in
Congress. The first dimension is generally aligned with political
ideology, often (though not always) translatable as political party. The
second dimension varies across time." For the 1970s, the second
dimension appears to be related to a district's relative poverty. Their
work provides us with a tool through which we might gauge how big a
role ideology played in the vote. Although party politics are clearly an
important factor, there had to have been something strong enough to
convince 30 Republicans to vote against the wishes of Senator Baker and
152 Democrats to vote against the wishes of President Carter, who
opposed the exemption.
B. What Economic Influences Might Affect a Congressman's Vote?
It is often assumed that a Representative's utility is maximized
through reelection, which requires that they maximize the utility of a
majority of their constituents. Thus, the vote on the Tellico Dam
exemption should reflect a district's priorities regarding the economic
tradeoffs between endangered species preservation and potential
economic growth.
In the Tellico case, the benefits of maintaining the Snail darter's
habitat accrue in small amounts to almost everyone, but their value is
largely subjective (existence values) or uncertain (option values).4 9 These
attributes provide considerable economic rationale for a prohibitive
conservation policy. Where costs are not specific, such as those in the
ESA itself, votes tend to be overwhelmingly in favor of species
preservation. Where potential costs are definable, as in the Tellico case,
the situation becomes controversial nationally, even though, in the case

120 (Claudia Goldin & Gary D. Libecap eds., 1994) [hereinafter Poole & Rosenthal, Congress
and Railroad Regulation]; Keith T. Poole & Howard Rosenthal, The Enduring NineteenthCentury Battlefor Economic Regulation: The Interstate Commerce Commission Act Revisited, 36
J.L. & ECON. 837 (1993); Keith T. Poole & Howard Rosenthal, Patterns of Congressional
Voting, 35 AM. J. POL. SCI. 228 (1991); Keith T. Poole & Howard Rosenthal, A Spatial Model
for Roll Call Analysis, 29 AM. J. POL. Sci. 357 (1985).
47. Poole & Rosenthal, Congress and Railroad Regulation, supra note 46.
48. Id. For example, Poole and Rosenthal discuss the split in the late 1800s as one
between agrarian and urban interests. Id.
49. Existence values are what one holds for a good or amenity that may never be used.
In this case, the existence value of an individual for the Snail darter is simply the utility an
individual gets from knowing the species continues to exist. Option values are what one
holds for a good or amenity based on its potential future value. In this case, the value one
might hold for the Snail darter is the hope it contains some future market (or other) value
such as in pharmaceuticals or as a biological necessity for the maintenance of a valued
ecosystem.
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of the Snail darter, the direct costs of the decision were localized to
Tennessee.Y This case put dollars and species together in such a way that
the subjective probability of a similar, expensive case in one's own
neighborhood increased significantly.
From this perspective, when Representatives were forced to
choose between the preservation of a single, non-charismatic endangered
species and localized federal spending, several demographic, ecological,
economic, and political variables within a congressional district should
have influenced the way a Representative voted.
Van Liere and Dunlap51 review the hypotheses and empirical
evidence on the factors influencing environmental concerns in the 1970s.
Based on this review, we identified several economic, demographic, and
environmental variables, in addition to the political dimension discussed
above, that should impact a congressman's vote. Since the vote would set
a precedent, the variables should reflect a district's expectations of the
net benefits from maintaining or discarding the prohibitive nature of the
policy. The economic expectations are hypothesized to center on
education and income levels, age, and financial and management
interactions with the government.
1. The income-education dimension in species protection
How legislation affects the general welfare of a district's
constituents depends upon income and education levels in diverse ways.
The effects of the two are difficult to separate; when education levels
rise, income levels follow. We consider high income and high education
(COLLEGE) to be on one end of the spectrum, while low income and low
education (BELOWY) are on the other. Higher levels of both are
expected to improve the welfare of the community. The higher one's
income, the easier it should be to avoid the ill effects of any cost the ESA
might impose, and the higher one's education, the more one should be
aware of the scientific and economic arguments in favor of species
preservation.
Simultaneously, the lower the income level of the district's
population, the higher the potential costs of the ESA and the lower the
probability that one would support it. There are several important
50. There is a notable controversy over whether there were any real economic benefits
to be gained from the Tellico Dam. Among other things, the original benefit-cost study was
proven to have significantly overestimated benefits. Early recalculations, available in 1979,
projected that, at best, the dam would break even rather than realize the 7-to-1 benefit-cost
ratio claimed by the TVA. See generally U.S. Government Accounting Office, Comptroller
General of the United States, The Tennessee Valley Authority's Tellico Dam Project-Costs,
Alternatives, and Benefits: Report to the Congress (1977).
51. van Liere & Dunlap, supra note 45.
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income effects. First, if poverty in a district is high, any federal project
brings welcome government dollars into the local economy regardless of
environmental impacts. Those dollars carry the hope for long-term
revival. TVA's Tellico Dam was in such a district and carried such hopes.
Second, poorer individuals or districts have a much higher discount rate
on the future. When one is below the poverty line, one cannot afford to
look very far into the future for possible benefits, especially when the bill
for endangered species is due today.
Van Liere and Dunlap summarize the period's findings on the
role education and income play in determining levels of environmental
concern. Their analysis shows strong support for a correlation between
higher levels of education and higher levels of environmental concern.
With respect to income, they find a mixed bag of results. Though higher
income is generally hypothesized to result in higher levels of
environmental concern, the evidence from several studies is inconclusive. 2 The hypothesis in this study is that, through higher expected
costs of the prohibition in lower income districts and through the
purported luxury-good nature of species preservation, lower income
levels will favor exempting the dam.
2. Varying levels of local industrialdevelopment and economic growth
The ESA particularly affects two types of industry. The first are
primary sector industries associated with the use of natural resources
(agriculture, forestry, fisheries, and mining),s1 The second includes
industries that rely on development or expansion that converts land use
away from a "natural" state u A district whose population is dependent
on either of these types would be less willing to uphold the prohibitive
nature of the ESA, since the potential costs are more specific and a large
portion of the constituents could suffer negative economic consequences.
Again, van Liere and Dunlap find generalized support for this ruralurban split on environmental concern.
Areas in which these industries are heavily represented are, in
general, areas that have a low population density and a lot of land.
Because congressional districts are organized to include equal

52. Id.
53. See, e.g., Gardner M. Brown & Jason F. Shogren, Economics of the Endangered Species
Act, 12 J. EcON. PERSPS. 3, 13-14, (1998); Clair A. Montgomery et al., The Marginal Cost of
Species Preservation:The Northern Spotted Owl, 26 J. ENVTL. EcON. & MGMT. 111 (1994); Dean
Kleckner, Statement of the American Farm Bureau Federation to the Endangered Species
Task Force of the House Resources Committee on Reauthorization of the Endangered
Species Act (May 18, 1995).
54. Donald M. McLeod et al., Factors Influencing Support for Rural Land Use Control: A
Case Study, 44 AGRIc. & RESoURCE ECON. REV. 44 (1999).
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populations, land area and population density will have opposite effects
on the probability of voting for the exemption. A GIS mapping of the
1978 congressional districts (Figure 1) depicts the districts' political
parties overlaid with their votes on the Tellico project.5 We have elected
to use population density (Popn Density) in the empirical work." While
the figure leads one to expect an effect, it also documents that several of
the largest districts (e.g., Eastern Montana, Interior California, Northern
Maine) did not vote on this matter.
FIGURE 1:1978 CONGRESSIONAL VOTE ON THE TELLICO DAM
EXEMPTION FROM ESA

High population densities are associated with urban areas. City
dwellers have lower expected costs because the area is developed and its
industries generally do not rely on natural resources. The most densely
populated districts, with 100 percent urban population, should have
virtually no expected costs associated with the ESA; their benefits derive
largely from existence values since it is unlikely there are opportunities
to enjoy the presence of these species in the immediate vicinity.

55. This map would not have been possible without the help of Wendy Hunter, class
of 2003, and Tom Crawford, Assistant Professor, Environmental Studies, Gettysburg
College, Gettysburg, Pa.
56. The reason is simply that the product of population density and land area is
population, and, theoretically, population is constant across districts.
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Districts that are mostly urban, but include some rural land, may
derive greater direct benefits from the presence of endangered species
(though the costs would still be negligible).57 Existence values may be
higher as well, since the choice to live in a more rural setting may reflect
higher values for nature, or a "not in my back yard" attitude. These
districts would tend to favor the Snail darter perhaps even more than in
a denser urban area. Districts with the lowest population densities are
often farming communities where the ESA would be expected to have a
negative impact and farmers would probably vote for the exemption out
of fear of their own future costs under the act. In the same vein, districts
within concentrated regions that face specific economic conditions (like
the open, public land dominated Western states or depressed Southern
states) might be expected to fear the prohibitive nature of the act more
than others (or care less about environmental concerns). Therefore, one
expects the coefficient on Popn Density to be positive.
3. Federal land
The predominance of federal lands in a district is expected to
significantly impact a congressman's decision in this case. First, federal
lands are the most straightforward to use for species protection, so these
lands are the most likely to be directly affected by the ESA. Second, the
Tellico project was taking place on land acquired by the TVA. Finally,
federal lands should be managed for benefits at the national level but
often are primarily used for local interests. In this case that pits such
local uses against national ones, the outcome should reveal the
importance of local considerations. We expect to find that, if local
concerns outweigh federal ones, the larger the percentage of public land
(FedLand), the less likely the district voted to uphold the ESA, and vice
versa.
4. Expectationsof age-dependent net benefits from endangeredspecies
We hypothesize that a younger constituency will be less willing
to accept the dam's exemption. Van Liere and Dunlap demonstrate that
there is strong empirical support for such a negative relationship.8 The
exemption would be seen by younger generations both as degrading
57. The percentage of urban dwellers, a census statistic that might have shed some
light on this issue, was not included as an exogenous variable because it is highly
correlated with the income and education variables, as well as with the population density.
Some useful insight can still be gleaned from the percent urban. The mean of this statistic is
75 percent, which highlights the facts that (a) most congressional districts include at least
one large urbanized area and (b) the population density and land area variables are
distributed unevenly across congressional districts.
58. van Liere & Dunlap, supra note 45.
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environmental quality and as something desired by the establishment.
Additionally, for retirees, there is a shorter horizon for the accrual of
benefits. Unless they are motivated by a bequest motive, one expects
them to consider the benefits smaller than longer-lived age groups. They
might perceive activities such as preservation as increasing their taxes.
On the other hand, they are likely to minimize the impact of future costs.
For the youngest voters, the potential benefits and likelihood of future
costs are increased. This economic concern could dampen the expected
positive relationship between age and the probability of a district
favoring exemption. Thus, the average age of its population (Median
Age) is expected to be an important factor in shaping the district's
preferences.
5. Local environmental conditions and their associatednet benefits
The potential for costly run-ins with the ESA increases with the
number of resident endangered species (Species), but so do local
awareness about endangered species and the ability to enjoy their
presence. Both benefits and costs are likely to be higher than in other
portions of the country. Thus, though it is certainly an important local
aspect, there is no determinate effect on welfare a priori based simply on
the number of endangered species living in the state according to the
Fish and Wildlife Service's 1978 list. 9 One must consider the costs of
maintaining the district's fauna as well. Are the costs that support a
specie's preservation low, as they often can be when plants or other
highly localized species are the ones under consideration, or deflected, as
they might be through federal (or other) grants for conservation?
Immediately after Congress passed the ESA in 1973, the federal
government provided grants to states based on their compliance with the
law (ES Money).' Some states realized millions of dollars in federal
government expenditures to help establish an endangered species
preservation bureaucracy. Total expenditures between 1973 and 1979
range from zero dollars in 28 states to between 1 million and 5 million
dollars in three states (California, Colorado, and New York). 61 One
would expect a congressional vote to reflect such financial support not
only because of the direct fiscal stimulus, but also because the alacrity
with which some state governments brought themselves into compliance
reflects local support for the act.62
59.

This is not reported by congressional district.
U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Fish & Wildlife Serv., 4 ENDANGERED SPECIES TECHNICAL
BULL. 3-5 (Dec. 1979) [hereinafter ES TECHNICAL BULL.].
61. Id.
62. Put crudely, for those with a taste for "pork," federal funds to protect endangered
species were a substitute for federal funds to build a dam.

60.
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Among the districts that could be expected to support the act are
those in which critical habitat designations had been made. By 1980,
critical habitats had been designated for several species (Hab1980)."
Districts with multiple habitat designations acted quickly to preserve
species and to accept the potentially high costs of this preservation
locally. Such districts, those with a high value for HAB1980, are expected
to favor upholding the ESA.
C. Generalized Environmental Concerns: The League of Conservation
Voters (LCV)
The Tellico Dam vote was one of 30 votes included in the 1978
League of Conservation Voters' scorecard of congressmen's environmental records. This assessment presents an opportunity to weigh
differences between the specifics of the Tellico vote and other environmental votes that year. If their economic effects are stronger in the Tellico
vote, there is further evidence that economic concerns weighed heavily
in the Tellico vote.6 As the potential costs of the ESA became as clearly
visible as they did in the Tellico case, a precedent would be set for the
political ability and desire to provide public goods in cases where the
economic benefits are dispersed and the costs are more localized and
immediate. If more self-interested activity is shown through comparison
with the LCV Scorecard, then the true difficulty of balancing economic
costs and benefits from environmental protection is underscored by the
fact that a prohibitionary law, passed with virtually unanimous support,
was bypassed for local, not national or global, interests. If, however, the
Tellico vote is affected in basically the same fashion as the other 1978
environmental votes, it is more likely that the global (national) costs of
the prohibition outweighed the benefits and the exception was justified
given the existing set of national preferences for public goods like species
diversity.

63. Critical habitats are listed in the Federal Register 1967-1980. Individual dates of
entry for listings through 1979 are available in ES TECHNICAL BULL., supranote 60, at 10-11.
64. This assumes the model we use to test the Tellico vote can be applied to other
environmental votes. If the economic variables appear important for those votes as well,
and if they are stronger in the Tellico vote, then we believe there is additional evidence in
favor of economic effects in the Tellico vote.
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IV. ANALYSIS
A. Limited Dependent Variable Results
The October 1978 vote to exempt the Tellico Dam was analyzed
to ascertain whether the Representatives' votes reflected the economic
interests of their districts. This vote was taken a few months after the
amendments that included the first economic considerations passed
easily.
The source of the congressional district level data is the 1970
Census of Population.65 ESA compliance funds are taken from the
Endangered Species Bulletin for 1979;' the Federal Register provides the
information on listed species; and federal lands data is compiled from
ESRI's ArcUSA database and a digitized map of the 1978 congressional
districts.68
The dependent variable is a 0-1 choice representing a representative's vote. A "1" indicates that the representative voted against the
exemption (i.e., for maintaining the ESA). Abstentions or failure to cast a
vote resulted in exclusion from the sample, leaving a total of 388
observations.
1. Party or ideology?
Empirical analyses of congressional votes often discover that a
large portion of the vote can be explained by a variable reflecting
political ideology. We first ran a logit regression 69 of the Tellico vote
against the representative's political party (PARTY) and environmental
and economic variables. We then ran a second logit regression using the
Poole-Rosenthal D-NOMINATE data, to see whether political ideology
explains the results better than political party. In both regressions,
variants of the specification were tested to see how much the economic
variables contributed to the explanation of the voting probabilities as a
whole. As will be discussed, while party and ideology have large
marginal coefficients and clearly influenced the outcomes, the economic
variables are also an important part of the story. The results are shown in
Table 1.
65. The 1980 Census was not used because the data was reported using the updated
1980 districts, which differ from the districts as they stood at the time of the vote.
66. ES TECHNICAL BULL., supra note 60.
67. See supranote 63.
68. ArcUSA 1:2M, State and Country Statistical Attribute Layers (Environmental
Systems Research Institute, CD-ROM, ed. 1, rel. June 1, 1992).
69. A logit regression uses properties of the logistic probability distribution function to
analyze discrete choice data (coded 0-1), such as a "yea" or "nay" vote, as a function of
independent explanatory variables.
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TABLE 1: LOGIT REGRESSIONS ON TELLICO DAM VOTE

Variable

Constant
Party

I
(Party)
Logit
Marg.
Coef.
Effect
(Std Err)
(Std Err)
3.12**
0.707**
(1.38)
(0.313)
-.434**
-1.92**
(0.069)
(0.31)

Dimi
College
BelowY
FedLand
Popn
Density
Median
Age
ESMoney*
101
Species
Hab1980
N. obs.

0.139**
0.031**
(0.069)
(0.014)
-0.137**
-0.031**
(0.006)
(0.029)
-0.018**
-0.004**
(0.008)
(0.002)
7*106
3*10 .5
4*102*10
-0.067
-0.015
(0.045)
(0.010)
0.016**
0.069**
(0.004)
(0.019)
-0.053**
-0.012**
(0.003)
(0.015)
0.267**
0.060**
(0.081)
(0.018)
388
388
Percent correct
78%

II
(Dim1)
Logit
Marg.
Coef.
Effect
(Std Err)
(Std Err)
0.277
1.31
(1.67)
(0.353)

Mean of
Variable

0.33
-7.06**
-1.49**
(0.831)
(0.170)
0.173**
0.037*
(0.071)
(0.015)
-0.110**
-0.023**
(0.011)
(0.034)
-0.022**
-0.005**
(0.010)
(0.002)
4*106
.2*10 -5
4*106
2*10-5
-0.065
-0.014
(0.011)
(0.052)
0.045**
0.010**
(0.021)
(0.005)
-0.010*
-0.050**
(0.006)
(0.024)
0.069**
0.327**
(0.094)
(0.020)
388
388
predicted outcome:
83%

X-squared (2*(LogL-LogL(R)):
154
230
** statistically significant at the 95% level or above
* statistically significant at the 90% level or above

-0.06
5.73
13.27
8.32
2978
28.56
7.53
18.2
1.21
388
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Our analysis sets Republicans equal to one. Since Republicans
generally voted for the exemption, the coefficient on Party is expected to
be negative. It is; the marginal effect (evaluated at the mean) is -0.434
(see Table 1, column 2). 70 The regression of Vote against Party alone
correctly predicts 231 of the 388 cases. The vote regressed against
economic and environmental variables alone increases the number of
correct predictions to 279 (results not shown). The regression of Party
and all the other variables results in 302 correct predictions. We conclude
that economic considerations were an important factor in the Tellico
vote.
Substituting Dim1, in which party is one consideration, for Party
in the first regression leads to 298 correct predictions of 388 votes.
Substituting Dim1 for Party in the regression with all the other variables
increases the number of correct predictions to 322. 7' The chi-squared
statistics for all the regressions are statistically significant, but the Dim1
equations have greater statistical explanatory power. The Dim1
regression (third and fourth columns of Table 1) results in a significantly
larger marginal effect (-1.44). For these reasons, we conclude that Dim1,
Poole-Rosenthal's measure of ideology, is preferred to Party.
The regression with both Dim1 and Dim2 results in only 305
correct predictions as compared to 320 when the economic and
environmental variables are combined with Dim1. A regression
(unreported here) of the economic and eco-regional variables on Dim2
reveals that Dim2 is related almost exclusively to the variables associated
with income and education. A higher Dim2 indicates a poorer area,
while a lower Dim2 indicates a higher percentage of college educated. It
would appear that Dim2 for this time period reflects poverty conditions
in a district. Thus, Dim2 ignores the information contained in the other
economic variables. For these reasons, we conclude that the specification
including all the economic and environmental variables is preferred to
the one with Dim2.
2. Income and education
In order to highlight the spectrum's extremes and the implications for costs and benefits, the two variables used in our analysis are the

70. Similarly, for the equations using Dim1, the conservative element of the Congress
has a higher dimension coordinate, and thus we expect a negative coefficient. The
correlation coefficient for Dimi and Party is 0.70.
71. Running these regressions as linear probability model (ordinary least square)
regressions, the adjusted R-squareds are 0.059 (party alone), 0.216 (economic variables
alone), and 0.307(party and economic variables). See Thomas. W. Gilligan et al., Regulation
and the Theory of Legislative Choice: The InterstateCommerce Act of 1887, 32 J.L. & EcON. 35, 3561 (1989); Poole & Rosenthal, Congress and RailroadRegulation, supra note 46.
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percentage of college-educated individuals (College), representing the
high end of the spectrum, and the percentage of persons below the
poverty line (BelowY), representing the low end. The marginal effect of
College in the regressions including Dimi is similar to that in the
regression including Party (0.037 versus. 0.031 respectively). The
coefficient is statistically significantly different from zero in all
regressions. This difference indicates that the more educated the
district's population, the more likely their representative voted to
preserve the Snail darter. The marginal effects of BelowY in the two
regressions are also similar (-0.023 for Dim1 and -0.031 for Party). The
coefficient is negative and statistically significantly different from zero in
all regressions. This effect confirms the expectation that poorer
communities favored the dam; they chose not to risk potential present
benefits for even more uncertain future benefits.'
3. Industry and economic growth
The results provide little support for the hypothesis that areas
open for extensive growth will support the exemption and heavily
urbanized areas will not. The marginal effects for Popn Density are small
and insignificant. 7 It is interesting to note that in the states that border
Tennessee, the only votes opposing the exemption came from urban
districts in Atlanta and St. Louis. 74 Though the econometric results find
almost no relationship between population density and a
representative's decision, visual inspection of Figure 1 suggests that the
absence of votes from congressmen representing several large districts
may have influenced our results.

72. Many other variables are available, such as the actual per capita income levels, the
average number of school years, and the percentage of individuals without an eighth grade
education, but, as noted, income and education variables are highly correlated. College
education and poverty status provide the most intuitively interpretable results and serve to
delineate the two different effects of education (higher levels increase the perception of
future benefits) and income (higher levels decrease the impact of present costs).
73. If only Democrats' votes are considered, population density is significant at the 90
percent confidence level, though the marginal effect is still very small. If only economic
variables are used, then population density is significant at the 95 percent level, and
slightly larger (0.00001). The relationship between ideology and population density is
explored visually; Figure 1 shows political party overlaid on districts, where smaller
districts do appear to vote more frequently for upholding the ESA.
74. States bordering Tennessee are Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Missouri,
Mississippi, North Carolina, and Virginia. Of the 69 votes from these states (21 R., 48 D.,
including Tennessee), the vote was 60 to 4 in favor of the exemption.
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4. Federal land
The percentage of the district held as federal land has a negative,
significant effect on the probability that a district voted to uphold the act.
These areas may see conflict between federal and local goals and fear
that federal lands in their area will be used for preservation purposes
over local development purposes.
5. Age effects
The effect of Median Age in the Dim1 regression involving the
full House is negative and not statistically significantly different from
zero. The effect is also negative and insignificant in the other regressions.
There is no clear-cut relationship between age and the perceived benefitcost ratio for a district.
6. Species andfederalfunds
Species has a negative, statistically significant effect (-0.010) in
the regression involving Dim1 and the full House (-0.012). Presumably,
this means that the greater the likelihood that endangered species lived
in a state, the more likely a congressional district favored the awarding
of exemptions. This result supports the conclusion that expected
localized costs outweigh any local benefits that might accrue from this
public good.
ES Money has a positive, statistically significant effect (0.010) in
the Dim1 regression, which reflects both a local desire for preservation in
its own right as well as increased local expenditures funded by federal
dollars. Support for the exemption came from states that were not yet in
compliance or had garnered limited dollars. These are likely regions
where the state dragged its feet on compliance because the perceived
benefit-cost ratio was low.
The number of species with critical habitat designations in a
district (Habl980), however, increases the probability that a district
voted to uphold the ESA (marginal effect of 0.069 for Dim1). Since these
designations include setting aside land for the purpose of species'
preservation, the significant, positive relationship signals that districts
that moved quickly to establish habitat had local interests in line with the
preservation of habitat.
B. Comparison of the Tellico Vote to Other Congressional
Environmental Votes
A set of ordinary least squares regressions was performed using
each congressman's score on the 1978 League of Conservation Voters
(LCV) Environmental Scorecard (adjusted to remove the Tellico vote) as
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the dependent variable. 5 This helps to place the Tellico vote in the
context of other 1978 congressional votes involving environmental
decisions. Differences between the two regressions reflect the specificity
with which these variables are integrated into the Tellico vote. It should
be noted at the outset that the estimated marginal effects of all the
economic variables, and the constant, are greater for the Tellico
regressions than for the LCV regressions.
Table 2 summarizes the marginal effects for the Tellico
regressions and the LCV regressions for the two cases, using Dim1 to
account for political elements. One should recognize two points in Table
2. First, in general, the marginal effects from the logit regressions on the
Tellico vote (Col. I-III) are generally greater than the estimated effects
from the OLS regressions on the LCV scorecard. Second, variables are
statistically significant across regressions, with the exception of Federal
ES Dollars and the designation of critical habitat in a district, which are
significant for the Tellico Dam vote but not for the LCV score. However,
the number of endangered species in a state is significant and negative in
both cases indicating that districts in states with higher numbers of
endangered species voted against upholding the act and against
environmental causes in general. Furthermore, the concerns raised with
federal funds for species protection and the designation of critical habitat
did not have carryover implications for overall district concerns about
the environment. This result is somewhat surprising, as one might have
expected higher critical habitat levels to reflect an overall willingness to
support the environment as well. However, the percentage of federal
land remains a significant and negative indicator of LCV score, and
perhaps this captures the relevant concerns.

75. The Scorecard takes the percentage of "environmentally correct" votes out of all
votes cast by a representative, making a deduction for unexcused absences. There were 30
votes in 1978. The Tellico vote was purged, and the Scorecard recalculated.
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TABLE 2: COMPARATIVE EFFECTS: TELLICO VOTE AND LCV SCORECARD

Variable
Constant
Dim1
College
BelowY
FedLand
Popn Density
Median Age
ESMoney * 105
Species
Hab1980

Dependent Variable:
Vote
Estimation method:
Logit
Marg. Effect
(Std Err)
0.277
(0.353)
-1.49**
(0.170)
0.037**
(0.015)
-0.023**
(0.011)
-0.005**
(0.002)

Dependent Variable:
LCV Score
Estimation method:
OLS
OLS Coef.
(Std Err)
0.518**
(0.059)
-0.742**
(0.027)
0.011"*
(0.003)
-0.006**
(0.001)
-0.001*
(0.0005)

(4*10-)
-0.014
(0.011)
0.010**
(0.005)
-0.010"
(0.006)
0.069**
(0.020)
388
83%

(7*10.7)
-0.0002
(0.002)
0.015
(0.010)
-0.0025**
(0.0007)
0.004
(0.004)
388

-4*10k

N. Obs.
Percent correct
predicted outcome
R-sqrd, adj
X-sqrd
230
•* statistically significant at the 95% level or above
*
statistically significant at the 90% level or above
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0.72

Table 3 reports the ratio of the marginal effects between the
Tellico and LCV regressions. The table shows the ratio of the marginal
effects of explanatory variables on the Tellico vote to those on the LCV
score. Political ideology has roughly twice the marginal effect on the
Tellico vote than on the LCV scorecard (2.01) when using the PooleRosenthal Dim1 variable. This result is consistent with the fact that
Republicans had a direct mandate to vote for the exemption. However,
the role of the economic variables also appears to be higher for the
Tellico vote than for the LCV average. The marginal effect of College was
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3.36 times greater in the Tellico vote, while BelowY was 3.83 times
greater. This emphasizes the tradeoff between the instant dollars that
would come in from a federally funded project versus the long run, less
tangible benefits derived from the increased probability of existence for a
single species. Higher levels of education do appear to create a lower
discount rate on future benefits, either from the increase in scientific
awareness or from higher income levels, for both the Tellico case and for
environmental votes in general.
Federal lands (FedLand) and numbers of species (Species) (with
ratios of 5 and 4 respectively) are also significantly more important in the
Tellico vote than in the votes concerning environmental legislation in
general. While this result for Species is expected, the result for FedLand
highlights the important role that the Endangered Species Act plays in
allocating land use, particularly on federal land. As discussed, critical
habitat (Hab1980) and Endangered Species funding (ESMoney) are not
significant for the LCV score and, thus, have a more clear-cut influence
on the Tellico vote.
TABLE 3: COMPARISON OF SIGNIFICANT ECONOMIC VARIABLES IN TELLICO
VOTE TO LCV SCORECARD VOTES

Variable

Ratio of Vote -DIM1/LCV
2.01**
3.36**
3.83**
5.0**
4.0**
388
ratio is significantly different than 1 at the 95%

Dim1
College
Belowy
Fedland
Species
N. Obs.
** indicates that
confidence level
ESmoney and Hab1980 not significant for LCV score.
Median Age, Popn Density not significant for either.

In short, economics mattered, and it mattered relatively more in the
Tellico vote than in the other votes included in the LCV scorecard.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND EXTENSIONS
This analysis suggests that economic interests played a role in
the vote on the Tellico Dam exemption and that some economic
balancing entered into decisions concerning endangered species
implicitly, even if the law did not require it explicitly. In the 1990s, the
inability of Congress to reach consensus over a way to explicitly
articulate important economic dimensions would stymie further
revisions of the ESA. Representatives voted on the Tellico Dam
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exemption according to their expectations for future interactions with the
ESA. This analysis has demonstrated that the higher the expectation that
a district would encounter a problem with an endangered species, the
higher the probability that a representative voted for options that were
expected to maximize local net benefits rather than global net benefits.
The apparent prohibitiveness of the ESA, which should have enforced
global benefits over local concerns, was circumvented for economic
reasons. These economic concerns are similar to those in the ESA
amendments passed a month earlier. These concerns were slowly
integrated into the ESA as reauthorizations occurred over the first two
decades and have come to play an even larger role as reauthorizations
have stalled in the last decade.
In 1982, after months of negotiations with industry representatives, state wildlife managers, and environmentalists, a "streamlined"
ESA was reauthorized by voice vote in both Houses. 76 Loggers, miners,
and electric utilities argued that existing law delayed or blocked private
and public projects, a legacy of the Tellico controversy. Although the
Reagan administration suggested that potential economic costs be
included among the factors considered for listing a species, the listing
criteria remained exclusively biological.7 The industries whose projects
required federal permits complained that existing law did not allow
them to learn in a timely fashion whether the project would imperil an
endangered species or its critical habitat.
The timber industry, in particular, has used the provisions in the
1982 revision to continue harvesting in endangered species' habitat. The
relevant provisions allow a regional authority, firm, or individual to
receive a permit for "incidental takings" of endangered species, if they
have created and implemented an approved Habitat Conservation Plan
(HCP).78 Due to their costly nature, there were few HCPs prior to 1991.
The decision of the God Committee not to allow an exemption for the
Northern spotted owl (as well as the early success achieved with HCPs
with Southern timber firms for the Red-cockaded woodpecker) put a

76. Martha Angle, Smooth Sailing Ahead: House, Senate PanelsApprove Bills on Endangered
Species, 40 CONG. Q. WEEKLY, 1107, n.20 (May 15, 1982). (Some version of the word
"streamline" appears in almost every report on this legislation, especially with respect to the
provisions prohibiting trade and protecting habitats. "Streamlined" is contrasted to "did not
significantly relax." See, e.g., 38 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 435 (1982).
77. Interior Secretary James Watt requested only a one-year reauthorization; the
Secretaries of Commerce and State favored a two-year extension, and the bill was originally
written as such. The House Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation Subcommittee adopted a
three-year extension, which passed. Environmentalists took Watt's stance as an attempt to
avoid conflict during off-year elections and as an intention to introduce a "significantly
relaxed" version of the Act following the election.
78. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1540, 10(a)(1)(b) (1973).
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focus on HCPs as a potentially inexpensive way to deal with the
prohibitive requirements of the ESA.
There are presently several hundred HCPs on the books or in the
works between individual firms and the Fish and Wildlife Service.
Proactive efforts are even beginning to surface, generally in order to
reduce uncertainty about potential future listings. Since there are
significant economic costs, firms are using HCPs to support their
economic interests. There is no reason why the HCP alternative cannot
be extended to other large landholders (e.g., ranchers). Using authority
granted in the 1982 revision, the Secretary of the Interior exempted many
small landholders in the 1990s, thereby mitigating their potential costs.
In March 1997, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that property owners had
legal standing to bring suits against the federal government for "failing
to consider the economic effect or scientific necessity of protecting
endangered or threatened species. '' 9 Stroup's suggestion that
compensation be paid is yet another possibility for introducing
balancing.'s
The likelihood of successfully revamping the ESA to directly
include economic costs dwindles with each additional level of evidence
on both sides of the argument. The millions of dollars foregone in timber
values from the Northern spotted owl and other birds juxtaposed with
the increasing awareness and value for ecosystem protection in addition
to species protection insures that any revamping of the ESA will have to
be a compromise. Unfortunately, the two camps are entrenched in their
positions regarding the costs of the ESA to themselves and society.
Balancing provisions were removed from the ESA, but Congress
has demonstrated that it will consider the necessary tradeoffs when
warranted. The issues raised by this paper imply that, with the addition
of the God Committee, HCPs, exemptions, and legal standing for
property owners (with the possibility of compensation), the ESA can
work successfully to give weight to non-quantifiable and dispersed
economic and social benefits in the face of concentrated and visible
economic costs.

79. Reynolds Holding & Alex Barnum, Door Open for Species Act Suits: Ranchers,
Farmers Can Claim Economic Loss, High Court Says, S.F. CHRONICLE, Mar. 20, 1997, at Al
(regarding outcome of Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997)), available at http://www.sfgate.
(last visited
com/cgibin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/1997/03/20/MN74759.DTL
Nov. 17, 2003).
80. Stroup, supranote 9.
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APPENDIX TABLE: VARIABLES, DEFINITIONS, SAMPLE MEANS
Variable

College
Below Poverty

Source

Form

1970 Census
1970 Census

Percent
Percent

Sample Mean
(388 obs.)
5.73
13.27

1978 Congressional
District Map, ESRI
ArcUSA database
(USGS DLG, 1980)
1970 Census

Percent

8.32

Line (BelowY)

Federal Land
(FedLand)

Population
Density
(PopnDensity)
Median Age
Federal ESA
dollars for species
(ESMoney)
Endangered
Species (Species)
Critical Habitat
Designations
(Hab1980)
Party

1970 Census
ESA Bulletin

Census measure
divided by 1000
for scale
Years
10,000's of
Dollars, for state

2.978

28.56
7.533

Federal Register, 1978

Count for state

18.3

Federal Register
Listings to 1979, 1978
Congressional District
Map
Congressional
Quarterly, 1978

Count for district

1.21

Dummy
Variable,

0.33

Republican = 1

Vote

Congressional
Quarterly, 1978

LCV

League of
Conservation Voters
1978, 1979 reports

Dim1

Poole & Rosenthal
NOMINATE data
online at
http://voteview.gsia.
cmu.edu/

October, 1978
House Vote on
Tellico Dam
Amendment
LCV score
(scaled to 0-1);
LCV score ranks
congressmen by
votes on
environment
Ranked indicator
of political
ideology

0.32

0.503

-0.06

